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What Adam  Smith wrote  in 1776  is still broadly  true: "Great
nations  are never  impoverished  by private,  though they  some-
times are by public,  prodigality  and misconduct."
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Govermments  in developing countries should and  The accumulation, in little more than a
do provide valuable goods and services, but re-  decade, of even a small part of the total labor
sources are wasted when public revenues  force in an unproductive sink can sap the econ-
support unproductive employees (at the expense  omy of its dynamism, eliminating improvements
of productive workers).  in living standards for all but the few who obtain
rent-yielding jobs.
The dynamic cost of such surplus labor in
the public sector is potentially much more  Moreover, creating sheltered employment
important than the static social cost normally  tends to be self-perpetuating. It creates and con-
atuributed  to urban unemployment. Fiscal  solidates vested interests that seek to peipetuate
resources are needed to support that unproduc-  the protected jobs.  In the inverse of the Lewis
tive "sink," thereby diverting resources from  model, the extent of surplus labor increases,
productive investment.  rather than diminishes, over time.
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In  his  seminal  article  Lewis  (1954)  depicted  the  process  of
economic  growth  as  one  in  which  labor  is  transferred  from  a
traditional  sector,  containing  surplus  labor  and  characterized  by
disguised  unemployment,  to  a  dynamic  capitalist,  or  modern,  sector  in
which  the  profit  calculus  prevails  and  labor  is  fully  employed.
Lewis  made  no  distinction  between  the  private  and  state  roles  in  the
modern  sector;  the  organization  and  control  of  economic  activity  were
irrelevant  to  his  model.
That  distinction  is  crucial  to  this  paper,  however.  Public
enterprises  and  bureaucracies  commonly  have  motives  other  than
profits;  they  may  be  subject  to  political  pressures  for  employment
provision  or  themselves  have  employment  objectives.  We  argue  that
the  labor  transfer  process  outlined  by  Lewis  can  give  rise  to  surplus
labor  --  in  the  sense  that  the  marginal  product  of  labor  is  less  than
the  wage  --  in  the  public  part  of  the  modern  sector  and  that  this  may
deprive  che  modern  sector  of  its  dynamism.  Since  Lewis  wrote,
empirical  research  has  cast  doubt  on  the  existence  of  significant
non-seasonal  disguised  unemployment  in  rural  areas  (Berry  and  Sabot,
1984,  pp.  100-4).  Instead  of  labor  moving  from  a  surplus  labor
sector,  the  transfer  may  thus  be  reversed,  i.e.  labor  leaves  a  sector
in  which  income  equals  marginal  product  for  one  in  which  the  wage
exceeds  marginal  product.  In  this  paper  we  view  Lewis  through  a
looking  glass.-2-
The  Lewis  model  has  been  criticized  for  its  assumption  of full
employinent  in  urban  labor  markets. Variants  have  been  developed
which  incorporate  open  urban  unemployment  and  disguised  unemployment
in  a free-entry,  flexible-wage  part  of the  urban  sector  (Harris  and
Todaro,  1970,  Fields,  1975,  Sabot,  1979).  The  excess  migration  and
urban  unemployment  that  equilibrates  rural  and  urban  expected  incomes
when  the  modern  sector  wage  exceeds  the  rural  supply  price  of labor
has  attracted  much  attention  in  the  literature,  but  it  is  not  well
established  that  the  social  costs  of such  static  labor  misallocation
are  quantitatively  important. In  this  paper,  we argue  that  a policy
response  to the  excess  demand  for  high  wage  jobs  --  of  which  urban
unemployment  is  a  manifestation  --  in  the  form  of public  sector
employment  creation  can  incur  social  costs  that  are  potentially  more
important  because  they  involve  waste  of investment  resources  that  can
grow  cumulatively  over  time.
The rapidly  expanding  literature  on rent-seeking  behavior  and
directly  unproductive  activities  (DUPs)  in  developing  countries,
initiated  by Krueger  (1974)  and  Bhagwati  (1982),  is  relevant  to  our
interpretation  of the  policy  response  to  unemployment.  Rent-seeking
in  the  labor  market  can  take  three  forms:  lobbying  for  rents  (e.g.
trade  union  pressures  to  raise  wages);  investing  in  rent  search  (e.g.
voluntary  unemployment  while  seeking  rent-yielding  jobs);  and
lobbying  for  the  provision  of rent-yielding  opportunities  (e.g.
pressures  for  the  creation  of  more  high-wage  employment).  Our
concern  is  with the  third,  less-thoroughly  explored  type.-3-
Section  2  presents  some  disparate  but  relevant  evidence  on  the
nature  and  potential  magnitude  of  surplus  labor  in  the  modern  sector.
Section  3  draws  on  public  choice  theory  and  the  'new  political
economy'  to  explain  how  the  phenomenon  might  arise.  Section  4  sets
out  a  simple  computable  general  equilibrium  model  designed  to  show
that  modern  sector  surplus  labor  can  generate  dynamic  resource  costs.
We  quantify  these  costs  in  Section  5:  numerical  simulations  examine
the  response  of  economic  growth  to  the  accumulation  of  modern  sector
surplus  labor  and  the  sensitivity  of  this  relationship  to  changes  in
behavioural  and  policy  assumptions.  Section  6  concludes.
2.  Some  Suggestive  Evidence
There  appears  to  be  a  structural  difference  between  the
industrialized  market  economies  and  the  developing  economies  with
regard  to  public  sector  employment.  In  the  23  developing  countries
for  which  data  were  available  for  a  year  near  1980  public  sector
employment  averaged  44  per  cant  of  total  non-agricultural  employment
(Heller  and  Tait,  1983);  extreme  cases  included  Ghana  (74  per  cent),
India  (72  per  cent),  Tanzania  (78  per  cent)  and  Zambia  (81  per
cent). 1 The  equivalent  figure  for  14  industrialized  countries  was  24
per  cent.
Heller  and  Tate  (1983,  pp.  15-16),  using  cross-sectional
evidence,  find  that  public  sector  employment  declines,  ceteris
1The  definition  of  'non-agricultural'  employment  is  not  provided
but  it  appears  to  include  only  employees  reported  in  surveys  of
establishments.-4-
paribus,  as  income  per  capita  rises.  By contrast,  time-series
evidence  for  industrialized  countries  suggests  that  they  have
experienced  a  gradual  increase  in  the  importance  of  public  sector
employment  as  their  income  per  capita  has  risen  (e.g.  Martin,  1982,
Musgrave  and  Musgrave,  1980,  pp.  142-3).  Its  importance  in  the
developing  countries  of  today  is,  therefore,  greater  than  would  be
predicted  from  this  historical  experience,  apparently  because  of  the
more  interventionist  character  of  their  governments.
Moreover,  time-series  evidence  for  some  developing  countries
indicates  that  public  sector  employment  has  been  growing  rapidly.
Table  1  presents  a  sample  of  14  developing  countries  for  which
comparable  data  on  public  sector  employment  are  available  for  recent
years  a  decade  or  more  apart. 2 In  every  case  omployment  in  the
public  sector  grew  more  rapidly  than  wage  employment  in  the  private
sector,  and  in  some  cases  the  latter  declined.  In  a  substantial
number  ot  4eveloping  countries  the  public  sector  has  been  the
dominant  sou.  ;e  of  employment  expansion  in  recent  years:  the  median
share  of  the  public  sector  in  the  increase  in  total  employment  in  our
sample  was  between  71  and  87  per  cent.
M4uch  of  this,  of  course,  may  have  been  due  to  the  growth  in
provision  of  valued  goods  and  services,  or  to  the  nationalization  of
private  enterprises.  Nevertheless,  the  greater  the  size  of  the
public  sector  the  greater  the  scope  for  lobbying  for  more  jobs. The
2Most  developing  countries  do  not  publish  statistics  on  public
and  private  sector  employment.-5-
motivation  may  be  provided  by  economic  rents.  The  mean  government
wage  averaged  4.6  times  national  income  per  capita  in  the  low-income
countries  of  the  Heller  and  Tait  samip-,e  compared  with  1.7  times  in
the  high-income  countries  (p.  47). This  may  be  due  not  only  to  a
relative  scarcity  of  human  capital  but  also  to  wages  set  above  the
supply  price  of  labor.
A  World  Bank  report  conmments  on  the  independent  employment-
creating  function  of  public  enterprises:
Overmanning  at  all  leveis  is  common  since  public  undertakings
are  often  viewed  as  employers  of  last  resort;  hiring  decisions
frequently  result  from  the  exercise  of  political  patronage  while
dismissal  procedures  are  cumbersome  and  ineffective  .....  These
practices  lead  to  frequent  losses  which  are  almost  invariably
financed  from  the  national  treasury  or  the  banking  system  (World
Bank,  1979,  p.  65).
This  theme  has  been  echoed  by  other  researchers.  Take  the  Indian
case.  Bhagwati  and  Desai  (1970,  p.  163)  argued  that  political
involvement  in  Indian  industrial  public  enterprises  contributed  to
excessive  hiring  of  unskilled  labor,  whereas  the  private  sector  was
less  vulnerable  to  political  pressures.  Chaudhuri  (1978,  p.  158)
argued  that  public  enterprises  had  become  a  drain  on  saving,  partly
because  of  their  underutilization  of  both  capital  and  labor.  In
1980-83,  public  enterprises  in  India  accounted  for  13  per  cent  of
GDP,  35  per  cent  of  gross  capital  formation  but  only  2  per  cent  of
gross  national  saving  (United  Nations,  1985,  pp.  171-2).  Jha  (1980,
p.  71)  explained  'the  reckless  expansion  of  the  bureaucracy'  as  the
response  of  successive  governments  to  'pressure  to  create  jobs  at  any
cost  which  they  have  found  extremely  difficult  to  resist'.  Bardhan-6-
(1984)  noted  that  the  incremental  capital-output  ratio  had  risen  more
in  the  public  sector  industries  than  in  the  private  sector  (pp.  29-
30). He  attributed  this,  and  low  capacity  utilization  in  the  public
sector,  to  the  'pervading  atmosphere  of  the  politics  of  patronage'.
'Overstaffing,  feather  bedding,  fake  payrolls'  and  other  employment
irregularities  in  public  enterprises  were  condoned  in  the  general
atmosphere  of  'parasitism  on  the  state'  (pp.  69-70).
It  has  been  claimed  that  state  manufacturing  enterprises  in
Turkey,  which  accounted  for  36  per  cent  of  employment  in
manufacturing  in  1979,  seriously  waste  resources.  This  was  said  to
be  condoned  by  government  because  of  vested  interests  (Walstedt,
1980,  p.  201).  Managers  claimed  that  'the  politicians  would  not
allow  us  to  let  go  of  surplus  personnel'  (p.  202)  while  others  argued
that  the  managers  themselves  were  largely  political  appointees  who
carried  out  political  objectives,  e.g.,  'to  increase  the  workforce
beyond  the  needs  of  production'  (World  Bank,  1981,  p.  26). In  1976
labor  input  per  unit  of  output  was  higher  in  the  public  than  in  the
private  sector  in  all  eleven  Turkish  manufacturing  sector  activities
in  which  the  two  sectors  were  comparable,  and  capital  input  per  unit
of  output  was  higher  in  nine  cases.  For  a  weighted  average  of  these
activities,  the  ratio  of  public  to  private  labor  inputs  per  unit  of
output  was  1.97  and  that  of  capital  inputs  1.66.  These  figures  imply
that  surplus  labor  represented  half  of  the  total  in  public  sector
enterprises,  and  surplus  capital  40  per  cent  (Krueger  and  Tuncer,
1982,  derived  from  Table  5).-7-
Hill  (1982)  obtained  similar  results  for  the  weaving  industry  in
Indonesia.  Capital  per  unit  of  ou'.put  in  1977  was  1.6  times  higher
in  public  than  in  private  enterprises  in  the  case  of  fully  automatic
looms  and  5.4  times  in  the  case  of  semi-au;omatic  looms.  For  labor
input  per  unit  of  output,  the  ratio  was  1.25  (fully  automatic  looms)
or  1.90  (semi-automatic  looms)  owing  to  the  employment  of  more
operative,  administrative  and  clerical  staff.  Hill  explained  these
findings  in  terms  of  inadequate  managerial  incentives  and  political
interference  (pp.  1020-22).
If  results  such  as  these  obtain  in  the  manufacturing  sector,
they  are  likely  to  apply  a  fortiori  to  the  provision  of  government
services  unrestrained  by  market  competition.  The  problem  has  been
endemic  in  the  public  service  as  well  as  in  the  state  corporations  of
Ghana.  Public  service  employment  grew  by  68  per  cent  over  the  period
1960-65  and  a  commission  of  inquiry  concluded  that  'there  is
widespread  underemployment  in  the  public  sector'  (Mills-Odoi,  1967,
p.  28). But  vested  interests  had  been  formed,  and  its  recommendation
that  public  sector  employment  should  be  considerably  reduced  was  not
implemented  (Mensah,  1969,  p.  21). Later  Killick  (1978,  ch.  9)
argued  that  overmanning  remained  one  of  the  major  problems  of  state
enterprises  in  Ghana;  and  between  1975  and  1982  public  service
employment  grew  by  15C  per  cent.
A  number  of  other  governments,  including  those  of  Egypt,  Ivory
Coast,  Mali,  Mauritius  and  Sri  Lanka,  have  explicitly  acted  as
'employer  of  last  resort',  particularly  for  university  graduates-8-
(World  Bank,  1983,  p.  103). In  Egypt  public  sector  employment
increased  from  less  than  10  per  cent  of  total  employment  in  1960  to
30  per  cent  (50  per  cent  of  non-agricultural  employment)  in  1976
(Handoussa,  1983,  table  1,  Hansen  and  Radwan,  1982,  p.  62).
Overmanning  was  estimated  at  40  per  cent  in  1976  (p.  207).  Because
graduates  were  a  free  good  to  public  agencies  --  funds  were
automatically  provided  --  the  bureaucracy  had  an  interest  in
expansion,  even  though  the  marginal  product  of  labor  may  well  have
been  negative.
In  Latin  America,  during  the  recent  period  of  macroeconomic
adjustment  to  external  imbalance,  consumption  has  declined  relative
to  production,  as  expected,  and  private  sector  employment  has  fallen.
However,  public  sector  employmenc  has  been  protected,  indeed
expanded,  in  some  of  these  countries  (Pfefferman,  1987). Brazil
offers  an  interesting  exampie  of  differences  in  public  and  private
employment  responses.  With  severe  recession  in  1983,  output  and
employment  in  the  private  non-financial  sectors  contracted  sharply
while  the  banking  system  reaped  seigniorage  gains  from  accelerating
inflation.  With  the  start  of  the  Cruzado  Plan  in  1986  inflation  fell
sharply.  Over  a  three-month  period  about  150,000  employees  --  some
20  per  cent  of  the  labor  force  --  were  disv-  sed  as  the  private
banking  sector  retrenched.  The  public  banks  made  no  such  response,
although  generally  in  a  weaker  financial  state  than  the  private
banks.-9-
3.  Towards  a  Theory  of  Government  Employment  Reseonse
The  'new  political  economy'  approach  to  government  policy  views
government  not  as  a  maximizer  of  social  welfare  but  as provider  of
political  favours  to  pressure  groups  (Becker,  1983)  or  an  organizer
of  political  support  for  staying  in  power  (Bates,  1983,  ch.  5).
Within  this  approach,  government  interventions  which  generate  rents
and  cause  inefficiency  are  frequently  capable  of  rational
explanation.  Private  interests  seek  economic  rents  through  their
influence  over  public  policy,  and  governments  respond  in  order  to
satisfy  favoured  political  supporters.  To  governments  the  creation
of  economic  rents  represents  a  relatively  costless  way  of  acquiring
political  resources.
Olson  (1965,  1982)  has  argued  that  small  groups  are  better  able
to  organize  for  collective  action  than  large  groups  on  account  of  the
'free  rider'  problem,  and  therefore  have  disproportionate  lobbying
power.  And  small  organizations  are,  similarly,  more  willing  to  incur
the  costs  of  pressing  for  measures  which  raise  their  members'  income
by  redistributing  income,  even  if  aggregate  income  declines,  than  for
measures  which  raise  the  income  of  society  in  general.  According  to
Olson,  rent-seeking  lobbies  are  like  'wrestlers  struggling  over  the
contents  of  a  china  shop...'  (1982,  p.  44).
We  neither  wish  nor  need  to  reject  entirely  the  view  of
government  as  an  exogenous  maximizer  of  social  welfare.  It  is
sufficient  that  this  role  be  tempered  by  elements  of  rent-seeking
behavior.  Ill-functioning  mixed  economies  with  powerful-10-
bureaucracies  and  little  public  accountability  are  fertile  grounds
for  rent-seeking  behaviour  and  patronage.  The  distribution  of
patronage  depends  on  the  social  and  political  systems.  Economic
rents  may  be  dispersed  either  narrowly  to  the  few  --  such  as
politicians  and  bureaucrats  in  a  kleptocracy  --  or  more  broadly  by
being  passed  down  the  line  to  favored  groups  --  such  as  party
loyalists.  In  many  developing  countries  the  powerful  are  subject  to
endemic  lobbying  from  members  of  client  and  kinship  groups.
Governments  are  particularly  prone  to  such  influences  in  Africa.-
Wherever  rents  derive  from  holding  jobs,  there  is  likely  to  be
lobbying  for  jobs. Lobbying  for  extra  public  sector  jobs  takes
various  forms.  It  can  take  place  at  the  individual  level  or  through
group  lobbying.  Governments  may  also  respond  to  unemployiient  by
creating  public  sector  employment  if  they  fear  its  consequences  for
political  stability.  Political  pressures  to  distribute  the  benefits
of  a  trade  windfall  may  cause  government  to  respond  in  part  by
expanding  public  sector  employment  (Auty  and  Gelb,  1986)  but  when  the
windfall  ceases,  lobbying  by  trade  unions  may  maintain  employment  and
ailing  private  sector  firms  are  likely  to  be  taken  over  by  government.
Freeman  (1986,  p.  76),  in  his  survey  of  public  sector  unionism,
concludes  that  its  distinctiveness  lies  in  '...union  potential  to
3Hyden  (1983)  has  argued  that  there  is  a  pervasive  network  )f
support  among  groups  connected  by  blood,  tribe,  community.  and  ol;her
affinities.  Such  groups  use  political  power  to  promote  the  inierests
of  their  members,  one  of  the  methods  being  tribalism  and  nepotism  in
hiring  practices  (p.  17). African  bureaucracies  and  public
enterprises  have  been  politicized  through  such  pressures.-11-
shift  demand  outward  through  the  political  process'  rather  than  move
employment  along  a  demand  curve.
The  size  of  the  surplus  labor  'sink'  in  the  public  sector
depends  on  the  relative  power  of  the  employment  lobby.  We  would
expect  the  strength  of  demand  for  public  sector  employment  to  vary
positively  with  the  gap  between  the  public  sector  wage  and  the  supply
price  of  labor.  However,  because  pressures  from  other  lobbies  grow
as  the  public  sector  wage  bill  mounts,  government  resistance  to  the
employment  lobby  may  also  increase  with  the  size  of  the  wage  gap. 4
The  introduction  of  a  government  response  into  a  simple  two-
sector  model  is  shown  in  Figure  1. Total  labor  supply  is  depicted  on
the  horizontal  axis,  with  rural  employment  being  measured  from  the
left  hand  origin  0  and  urban  employment  from  the  right  hand  origin
0'. On  the  vertical  axis  are  measured  marginal  products  and  wages.
The  marginal  product  curves  of  the  rural  sector  and  the  urban  modern
sector  (sectors  1  and  2  respectively)  are  mpl 1 and  mp1 2. In
competitive  equilibrium  a  common  wage  rate  (w 1O  = w20) is  established
and  employment  in  sectors  1  and  2 is  respectively  OA  and  O'A.
An  exogenous  raising  of the  modern  sector  wage  to  w21 --  we
assume  that  the  wage  in  the  public  and  private  components  of  the
modern  sector  is  the  same  --  creates  a  misallocation  of  labor,  with
rural  employment  expanding  to  OD  and  modern  sector  employment
contracting  to  O'D;  the  wage  gap  becomes  w21 - w1 l.  The  introduction
4Collier  (1986)  uses  such  a  countervailing  lobbying  framework  to
examine  the  effects  of  exogenous  shocks  on  public  sector  employment
and  wages.-12-
of  a  probabilistic  migration  relationship  then  creates  urban
unemployment  in  the  model.  Given  the  simplest  probability  function, 5
equilibrium  urban  unemployment  can  be  shown  by  means  of  the
rectangular  hyperbola  hl  h1: 6 modern  sector  employment  remains  O'D,
urban  unemployment  is  CD,  and  rural  employment  contracts  to  OC,  its
corresponding  marginal  product  being  w12.
Now  introduce  a  government  response  to  unemployment.  As  the
wage  gap  and  thus  unemployment  increases,  pressure  from  the
employment  lobby  is  assumed  to  increase  relative  to  pressures  from
competing  lobbies,  so  that  the  public  sector  employment  response  is
positive.  Given  unemployment  CD,  government  responds  by  creating
employment  in  an  unproductive  'sink'  (sector  3),  which  in  turn
generates more migration  and unemployment, and so on,  until  a new
static  equilibrium  is  reached.  The new urban sector  demand  curve  is
the  sum  of  the  labor  demands  of  sectors  2  and  3.
In  the  new  equilibrium,  sector  2  employment  is  O'D,  sector  3
employment  is  BD,  urban  unemployment  is  EB,  and  labor  in  sector  1  is
residually  determined  as  OE. The  marginal  products  of  labor  in  the
sectors  1,  2  and  3  are  respectively  w13, w23, and  0.7 The  loss  of
5The  probability  of  modern  sector  employment  for  a  worker  in  the
urban  sector  equals  the  ratio  of  modern  sector  employment  to  urban
labour  force.
6See,  for  instance,  Corden  (1974),  pp.  145-6.
7For  diagranmatic  purposes  the  wage  intervention  is  defined  in
terms  of  w 21 - w?O,  the  difference  between  the  modern  sector  wage
and  the  competitive  outcome.  The  diagram  would  be  more  complicated
if  the  wage  intervention  were  defined  in  terms  of  the  sectoral  wage
gap  w2i  - wli  as  is  done  in  the  model  to  be  computed  below.-13-
output  due  to  government  response  and  consequent  allocative
inefficiency  is  shown  by  the  area  under  mpl 1 between  E  and  C.
Quantitative  results  corresponding  to  this case  --  which  also  take
account  of  the  impact  on  productive  investment  of  the  taxation  of
sector  1  or  2  to  finance  the  sink  --  and  to  the  previous  two  cases
are  presented  in  Section  5.
4.  A  CGE  Model  with  Government  Employment  Response
The  model  is  kept  as  simple  as  possible;  it  comprises  three
sectors:  rural  (sector  1),  urban  (sector  2),  and  non-productive
government  (sector  3). The  productive  government  sector  is  included
in  sector  2. The  supply  functions  in  the  productive  sectors  are
Cobb-Douglas:
a.  1-a:
yi  = AjKj 1 (i  =  1,  2)  (1,2)
where  y is  production,  A  a  parameter,  K  and  L  capital  and  labor,  and
a factor  shares.  Wages  in  the  productive  sector  are  set  neo-
classically  by  post-tax  marginal  products:
w;  = pi(1-ti)  (1-ai)(yi/Li).  (3,4)
There  may,  however,  be  a  wage  gap,  a  constant  urban/rural  ratio:
w2=  (1  + 6)wl-  (5)
The  labor  force  is  made  up  of  employment  in  the  three  sectors
plus  unemployment:
L  =  LI  +  L2  +  L3  +  U-  (6)
Unemployment  is  an  urban  phenomenon;  expressed  as  a  proportion  of  the
urban  labor  force,  its  rate  is  therefore:
u  = U/(L 2 +  L3  + U).  (7)-14-
The  wage  gap  is  assumed  to  induce  excess  migration  and  urban
unemployment,  as  in  the  Harris-Todaro  model.  If  the  probability  of
urban  employment  depends  on  the  ratio  of  urban  sector  employment  to
urban  labor  force,  (7)  can  be  expressed  as  u  =  (w 2 - w 1)/w 2 (e.g.
Fields,  1975,  pp.  167-8).  However,  as  this  generates  implausibly
high  rates  of  unemployment  for  plausible  values  of  the  wage  gap,  a
migration  'damp  factor'  (m  > 1)  representing,  for  instance,  risk-
aversion,  psychic  costs  of  migration,  or  lack  of  information  on  the
part  of  rural  dwellers,  is  introduced:
u  = (w 2 - w 1)/mw2-  (8)
Government  attempts  to  absorb  some  of  the  unemployed  in  the
unproductive  sector,  employing  them  at  a  wage  equal  to  that  in  the
urban  productive  sector:
L3  =  gU.  (9)
Government  is  assumed  to  respond  to  urban  unemployment,  rather  than
directly  to  the  political  pressures  generated  by  the  wage  gap,  but
the  unemployment  rate  is  itself  a  function  of  the  gap. If  government
responds  to  pressures  from  rural  workers  as  well  as  from  the
unemployed,  its  response  parameter,  g  > o,  may  take  a  high  value.
Public  workers  cannot  be  seen  to  be  idle. In  order  to  create
the  impression  of  jobs,  the  government  may  also  provide  workers  in
sector  3  with  capital  (K 3),  although  the  sector  is  assumed  to  produce
nothing  of  value.  Examples  would  be  the  establishment  of  public
enterprises  producing  zero  value  added  at  world  prices.  or  the
construction  of  office  buildings  for  workers  in  the  sink.  The-15-
capital  intensity  of  sector  3  is  some  fraction,  q  >  0,  of  that  of
sector  2.
K3  =  qL 3 (K 2/L 2).  (10)
The  returns  to  capital  in  the  other  sectors  are  given  by:
Kiri  = pi  (1-ti)yi  - wiLi.  (1  1,2)  (11,  12)
To  finance  sector  3  the  government  levies  taxes  on  total  outputs
of  sectors  1  and  2  at  tax  rates  tj  and  t 2. The  government  budget  is
balanced:
2 o1t 1y  = w2L3 +  [qp 1 +  (1lq)p2I 3. (13)
Investment  in  sector  3  depends  on  the  depreciation  rate  (d):
13,t  =K3,t+l  - (1-d)  K3,t-  (14)
Total  demand  is  the  sum  of  factor  payments  after  tax  in  the
productive  sectors  plus  government  expenditure.  Value  of  demand  D
equals  value  of  supply,  and  markets  clear:
D  = I  K1r 1 +  I  wiLi  +  L3w 2 +  (qpl  +  (l-q)p  II3 . (15)
1,2a  1,2
D  ,Z  piyi  (16)
1,2
Di  = yi.  (17)
Demand  is  Cobb-Douglas,  so  that  real  demands  Di  are:
Dl  =  qD/p 1 (18)
D2 = (1-q)D/p 2. (19)
In  the  conventional  CGE  model  prices  clear  markets  and  inputs
determine  outputs.  Here  output  in  sector  3  is independent  of  inputs-16-
and  tax  rates  adjust  endogenously  to  satisfy  the  government  budget
constraint  and  clear  markets  by  reconciling  absorption  with  output.
The  model  is  updated  via  labor  force  growth,  technical  change
and  capital  accumulation:
Lt+1  =  Lt  (1  +  g)  (20)
Aj t+l  =  A, t  (1+tj)  (21)
K2,  t+1  =  K 2,  t (1-d)  +  12,  t-  (22)
It  is  assumed,  in  keeping  with  the  Lewis  model,  that  productive
capita  accumulation  occurs  only  in  sector  2  and  not  in  sector  1.
With  a  balanced  budget,  total  income  equals  total  output.
Saving  and  investment  can  therefore  be  shown  as:
S  So  (y 1 + Y2)  =I2 +  13  (23)
Hence:
I2  So  (y 1 + Y 2)  I3-  (24)
Productive  investment  is  diminished  to  the  extent  that  non-productive
investment  occurs.  However,  12  might  depart  from  this  value  in
either  direction:
I2  =  so (y 1 +  Y 2)  - 13  +  wF  =  so(y 1 +  y 2)  (25)
12  =  So  (y 1 +  Y2) - 13  -wC =  SO(Y 1 +  Y2) - I3  -w2L3- (26)
wF  (=  13)  is  additional  forced  saving:  a  Soviet-type  government  can
raise  taxes  without  affecting  productive  investment,  i.e.,  squeeze
private  consumption  to  maintain  productive  investment  as  a  proportion
of  output.  wC  (=  w2L 3) is  the  additional  consumption  required  to
maintain  private  consumption  at  its  previous  level  in  the  face  of
taxation  yielding  no  consumption  benefits.  In  this  case,  productive
investment  is  reduced  by  the  full  extent  of  taxation,  equal  to  non--17-
productive  expenditure.  The  same  result  would  be  obtained  if  the
effect  of  the  government  budget  was  to  transfer  income  from  profit-
recipients,  with  a  marginal  propensity  to  save  of  unity,  to  workers,
with  a  marginal  propensity  of  zero.
If  people  save  only  out  of  their  income  in  excess  of  subsistence
(n  = w10 =  w 20),  we  have  equations  (23')...(26')  respectively,  e.g.
S  = sl  (y 1 + Y2 - nL).  (23')
Table  2  sets  out  plausible  parameter  values  to  be  assumed  in  the
model,  and  initial  conditions  in  the  base  period.  The  Generalized
Algebraic  Modelling  System  (GAMS)  was  used  to  set  up  and  solve  the
model.
5.  Simulation  Results
We  present  results  for  six  different  cases.  The  first,
'misallocation',  involves  a  wage  gap  (o  = 1.5)  and  the  associated
sectoral  misallocation  but  no  urban  unemployment  (m  = 10,000)  and  no
government  employment  response  (g  = 0,  q  = 0). In  the  second,
'Harris-Todaro',  the  wage  gap  is  assumed  to  generate  urban
unemployment  (m  = 3). In  the  third  and  fourth,  'government  response',
government  responds  to  urban  unemployment  by  creating  government
employment  (g  > 0). The  fifth  and  sixth  cases,  'full  government
response',  have  government  respond  both  by  employing  workers  in  the
sink  (g  >  0)  and  providing  them  with  capital  (q  >  0). The  government
response  and  full  government  response  cases  distinguish  between  'weak-18-
pressures'  for  employment  (g  =  0.5,  q  =  0.5)  and  'strong  pressures'  (g
= 0.9,  q  = 1.0).
The  behavior  of  the  economy  over  13  'annual'  periods  is
simulated  in  these  six  cases. 8 Tables  3  and  4  show  the  behavior  of
relevant  variables  in  or  between  the  base  period  (period  0)  and  the
final  period  (period  13).
The  misallocation  case,  corresponding  in  Figure  1  to  wages  w1l
and  w 21 and  employment  OD  and  O'D  in  sectors  1  and  2 respectively,  is
taken  to  be  the  base  run. It  is  chosen  in  preference  to  the
competitive  labor  market  case  (w 1O  =  w 20) because  the  object  is  to
contrast  the  effects  (stressed  in  the  literature)  of  introducing
Harris-Todaro  unemployment  into  a  distorted  labor  market  with  the
effect  of  in  addition  introducing  a  government  response  function;  to
include  the  static  and  dynamic  costs  of  labor  misallocation  without
unemployment  would  blur  the  comparison.  Given  a  net  saving  rate  of
0.17,  capital  accumulates  at  3.7  per  cent. Since  labor  grows  at  2.0
per  cent  there  is  capital  deepening.  This,  together  with  technical
progress  at  a  rate  of  one  per  cent  in  the  rural  and  two  per  cent  in
the  urban  sector,  generates  growth  in  output  of  4.6  per  cent  and  in
8Sir:e  the  parameter  values  for  the  assumed  rates  of  change  from
one  period  to  another  correspond  to  typical  annual  rates  of  change  in
developing  countries,  results  in  the  form  of  rates  of  change  per
period  can  be  regarded  as 'annual'  rates  of  change.-19-
output  per  worker  of 2.5  per  cent. The  base  run  captures  a number  of
the  characteristics  of a relatively  successful  developing  economy. 9
The  Harris-Todaro  case  corresponds  to  wages  w12 and  w22,
employment  OC,  0'D  and  unemployment  CD in  Figure  1. Urban
unemployment  is  20 per  cent  of  the  urban  labor  force  and,  since  the
wage  gap  and  migration  damp  factor  are  fixed,  it  remains  there  over
the  13  years. Although  rural  employment  and  output  fall,  total
output  is  only  2 per  cent  lower  in  period  0 in the  Harris-Todarl  case
than  in  the  misallocation  case:  the  static  effect  of urban
unem!ployment  is  small. Moreover,  any  dynamic  effect  is  negligible:
output  per  worker  still  grows  at  2.5  per  cent. The  attention  paid  in
the  literature  to  migration-induced  unemployment  is  out  of  proportion
to  the  trifling  social  cost  of such  unemployment  suggested  by  our
simulations.
The  case  of  government  response  can  be  depicted  in  Figure  1  as
wages  w13 and  w23 and  employment  OE and  O'D  in  sectors  1  and  2
respectively,  employment  BD in  the  sink  and  unemployment  EB.  The
effects  are  qualitatively  the  same  whether  we consider  'strong'  or
'weak'  employment  pressures,  but  they  differ  quantitatively.  The
9The  assumption  that  capital  accumulation  takes  place  only in
sector  2 is in  the  spirit  of  the  Lewis  model  and  draws  support  from
empirical  evidence  for  a number  of  developing  countries:  it is
commonly  claimed  that  capital  intensity  is higher  in  the  urban  modern
sector  than  in  the  rural  sector,  and  that  there  is  a  ne'  transfer  of
saving  from  the  latter  to the  former  (for  instance,  Meller  and
Johnston,  1984). Indeed,  the  capital  stock  of  the  rural  sector  might
be interpreted  as land. Rental  rates  on capital  diverge  in  the  model
owing  to the  rapid  growth  of capital  in  sector  2: increasing  land
rents  per  acre  are  normal  with  economic  growth. Employment  growth
occurs  at the  same  rate  (2.0  per  cent)  in  both  sectors.-20-
former  response  function  is  not  implausibly  large;  although
government  creates  almost  one  sink  job  for  every  person  unemployed,
sink  employment  expressed  as  a  proportion  of  the  number  of  rent-
seekers  (U  +  L 1 ) is,  by  period  13,  only  5.4  per  cent  when  the
pressures  are  strong,  compared  with  2.6  per  cent  when  the  pressures
are  weak. As  a  proportion  of  the  urban  labor  force  sink  employment
is  18  per  cent  and  10  per  cent  respectively.
Expenditure  on  sink  employment  crowds  out  productive  investment.
K 2 grows  at  7.2  per  cent  in  the  misallocation  case,  and  7.1  percent
in  the  Harris-Todaro  case. When  there  are  pressures  for  job
creation,  the  rate  of  growth  of  K 2 drops  to  6.3  per  cent  if  they  are
weak  and  to  5.6  per  cent  if  they  are  strong.  The  static  effect  on
output  (a  fall  of  3.4  per  cent  in  period  0  when  pressures  are  strong)
is  itself  greater  than  in  the  Harris-Todaro  case.  More  important,
however,  is  the  dynamic  effect,  retarding  the  growth  of  output  each
year  by  0.5  per  cent  when  the  pressures  are  weak  and  by  0.9  per  cent
if  they  are  strong. 10
In  the  final  case  the  diversion  of  capital  into  the  sink  has  no
effect  on  sink  employment  or  urban  unemployment  but  productive
investment  suffers  further. In  period  13  the  sink  accounts  for  4.0
per  cent  of  the  total  capital  stock  in  the  weak  pressures  case  and
10 The  Harris-Todaro  case  would  produce  dynamic  effects
analogous  to  the  government  response  case  (without  investment
response)  if  government  provided  an  open-ended  compensation  scheme
for  the  unemployed.  In  most  developing  countries  government
unemployment  compensation  schemes,  if  they  exist  at  all,  are  weak  and
confined  to  those  already  in  modern  sector  employment.-21-
for  13.2  per  cent  in  the  strong  pressures  case;  and  for  12.8  and  42.9
per  cent  respectively  of  the  increment  to  the  total  capital  stock
over  the  13  periods.
The  further  loss  of  saving  for  productive  investment  reduces  the
annual  rate  of  increase  in  K 2 to  only  5.8  and  3.8  per  cent
respectively.  Output  per  worker  grows  at  only  1.6  per  cent  in  the
case  of  full  government  response  with  weak  pressures  and  at  0.5  per
cent  with  strong  pressures.  On  this  last  scenario  improvement  in
living  standards  is  thus  very  largely  eliminated.  Moreover.,  the
attempt  to  reduce  unemployment  is  futile:  the  number  of
unemployed  workers  is  substantially  higher  than  in  the  Harris-Todaro
case.
Various  sensitivity  analyses  were  conducted;  these  generally
confirmed  that  the  results  are  robust.  In  particular,  alternative
saving  assumptions  were  explored. 11  One  sensitivity  exercise  is  to
replace  saving  equation  (26)  with  its  alternative  formulation,  (26').
Instead  of  assuming  that  income  is  saved  at  the  rate  so  = 0.25,  we
assume  that  income  above  a  subsistence  level  (the  initial  competitive
wage)  is  saved  at  s 1 =  0.50. The  annual  growth  of  output  per  worker
remains  effectively  the  same  (2.6  per  cent)  in  the  base  run,  but  the
effect  of  introducing  government  response  is  greater. In  the  case
"lThe  choice  of  tax  rates  t 1 and  t 2 affects  the  relative
production  and  employment  of  sectors  1  and  2,  but  the  basic  result  is
little  different.-22-
of full  government  response  with  strong  pressures  the  fall  is  to  0.2
per  cent  instead  of to  0.5  per  cent  per  annum.12
Introducing  the  intermediate  saving  equation  (24),  we find  that
the  annual  growth  of output  per  worker  becomes  1.0  per  cent  in the
case  of full  government  response  with  strong  pressures. Thus  the
reduction  in  growth  (1.5  per  cent)  remains  significant,  being  three-
quarters  of the  reduction  in  the  case  of (26).  -But  the  assumption
that  saving  occurs  only  out  of income  in  excess  of subsistence  again
increases  the  sensitivity  of the  growth  rate  to the  presence  of  a
sink:  on saving  assumption  (24')  as  with (26),  annual  growth  of
output  per  worker  is  reduced  from  2.5  per  cent  to 0.5  per  cent  when
full  government  response  with  strong  pressures  is  assumed. 13
Only  in  the  Soviet-type  case  --  equation  (25)  --  is  economic
growth  little  affected  by  the  government  response. Here  the  annual
growth  of  output  per  worker  falls  from  2.5  only  to 2.0  per  cent. The
main  effect  is  a reduction  in  the  level  of consumption  in  all
periods. For  instance,  in  the  final  period  consumption  in  the  case
of full  government  response  with  strong  pressures  is  15  per  cent
below  its  level  in  the  misallocation  case. The  Soviet-type
12Both  in  this  case  and  in  the  cases  reported  below,  the  static
and  dynamic  effects  of the  sink  are  combined;  in  no case  does  the
static  effect  account  for  more  than  0.3  percentage  points  of  the  fall
in  growth  of  output  per  worker.
13A  more  sophisticated  version  of (24'),  allowing  saving
propensities  out  of subsistence  income  and  additional  income  of 0.15
and  0.30  respectively  and  keeping  the  real  subsistence  level  of
expenditure  constant  as  the  relative  prices  of products  1 and  2  vary,
produces  a corresponding  fall  in  annual  growth  of output  per  worker
from  2.2  to 0.5  per  cent.-23-
assumption  is  implausible  for  most  developing  countries,  however,
implying  as  it  does  that  governments  have  the  power  to  increase
taxation  simply  by  squeezing  consumption.
6.  Conclusions
Our  modification  of  Lewis'  model  takes  its  cue  from  another
great  developn,ent  econemist  writing  178  years  before  him:
Great  nations  are  never  impoverished  by  private,  though  they
sometimes  are  by  public  prodigality  and  misconduct.  The  whole,
or  almost  the  whole  public  revenue,  is  in  most  countries
employed  in  maintaining  unproductive  hands  .....  Such  people,  as
they  themselves  produce  nothing,  are  all  maintained  by  the
produce  of  the  other  mens'  labor.  When  multiplied,  therefore,
to  an  unnecessary  number,  they  may  in  a  particular  year  consume
so  great  a  share  of  this  produce,  as  not  to  leave  a  sufficiency
for  maintaining  the  productive  laborers,  who  should  reproduce  it
next  year. The  next  year's  produce,  therefore,  will  be  less
than  that  of  the  foregoing,  and  if  the  same  disorder  should
continue,  that  of  the  third  year  will  b  still  less  than  that  of
the  second  .....  (Smith,  1776,  pp.  342).±Q
Our  concern  is  not  as  broad  as  that  of  Smith  (1776)  and  Bacon
and  Eltis  (1976),  for  whom  the  non-marketed  sector  as  a  whole  was
unproductive.  Governments  in  developing  countries  should,  and  do,
also  provide  valuable  goods  and  services  which  generate  a  derived
demand  for  factors  of  production.  But  wasteful  diversion  of
resources  into  the  public  sector,  over  and  above  the  derived  demand
for  resources,  can  result  from  rent-seeking  and  rent-creating
behaviour.
There  is  an  important  difference  between  the  Smithian  approach
and  the  now-conventional  welfare  theoretic  approach  to  development.
14Quoted  in  Bacon  and  Eltis  (1978,  p.  v.-24-
The  latter  views  government  as  imperfect  but  well-meaning  and
educable,  as  definitely  part  of  the  solution  rather  than  as  part  of
the  problem.  Both  approaches  are  simplistic;  however,  this  paper
constitutes  another  nibble  at  the  edges  of  the  prevailing  paradigm
and  a  building  block  for  the  more  sophisticated  theory  of  policy-
making  in  developing  countries  that  should  come  to  replace  it.
We  have  shown  that  the  accumulation,  in  little  more  than  a
decade,  of  even  a  small  proportion  of  the  labor  force  in  an
unproductive  'sink'  can  sap  the  economy  of  its  dynamism,  eliminating
improvements  in  living  standards  for  all  but  the  few  who  obtain  rent-
yielding  jobs.  The  dynamic  cost  of  public  sector  surplus  labor
appears  to  be  much  more  important  than  the  static  social  cost
normally  attributed  to  urban  unemployment  in  the  context  of
probabilistic  migration  models.  Fiscal  resources  are  needed  to
support  the  sink  and  its  investment  claims,  thereby  diverting
resources  from  productive  investment.  Moreover,  creating  sheltered
employment  encourages  further  rent-seeking,  migration  and
unemployment.  The  experiments  conducted  to  examine  the  sensitivity
of  the  model  to  its  various  assumptions  suggest  that  the  main
conclusion  is  robust.
Instead  of  postulating  a  non-productive  sector  we  could  have
modelled  government  employment  response  as  an  expansion  of  modern
sector  employment  beyond  the  level  at  which  the  marginal  product
equals  the  wage. Instead  of  having  zero  productivity,  the  additional
employees  would  then  be  used  as  productively  as  possible  in  the  modern-25-
sector.  The  model  would  be  analytically  equivalent  to  one
conventionally  justifying  an  employment  subsidy,  but  would  differ
from  it  in  the  motivation  for  the  policy  intervention 15. However,
this  assumption  is  inconsistent  with  surplus  labor  being  confined  to
the  public  sector.  Nor  is  it  plausible  that  excess  labor  is  allocated
among  public  enterprises  according  to  the  elasticity  of  the  marginal
product  of  labor  with  respect  to  employment.  Our  zero  marginal
product  assumption  does  not  necessarily  define  the  other  extreme.  It
can  represent  an  average  of  positive  and  negative  marginal  products
in  the  sink,  or  it  may  incorporate  negative  externalities,  for
instance,  morale  effects  on  other  public  sector  employees.  The  urge
to  find  tasks  for  sink  employees  can  also  induce  rent-creating
regulation  of  the  private  sector.
The  phenomenon  of  public  sector  surplus  labor  has  been  most
obvious  under  populist,  highly  interventionist  leaders.  It  may  be
more  insidious  in  a  milder  form,  however,  because  its  effects,  which
may  take  several  years  to  become  visible,  are less  attributable;  it
is  less  likely,  therefore,  to  be  corrected.  But  recognition  of  the
ill-effects  of  surplus  labor  may  not  be  sufficient  to  reverse
policies.  Hysteresis  applies:  the  government's  response  itself
creates  or  consolidates  vested  interests  which  seek  to  perpetuate  i+.
Economists  search  for  explanations  of  why  some  developing  countries
have  succeeded  in  growing  rapidly  while  some  others,  equally  well
15 More  generally,  the  technical  relationships  analysed  in  this
paper  stem  from  the  literature  on  shadow  pricing,  of  which  Sen  (1960)
is  a  pioneering  and  Anand  and  Joshi  (1979)  a  recent  example.-26-
-endowed  and  with  similar  rates  of  saving,  have  failed.  One  strong
focus  has  been  on  foreign  trade  regimes;  the  Lewis  model,  when
viewed  through  a  looking  glass,  is  suggestive  of  another  explanation
For  failure.-27-
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The  World  Bank.Table  1  --  Selected  Developing  Countries:  Growth  of  Wage  Employment  in  the  Public  *nd
Private  Sectors
Average  Growth  Percentage  share
(ner  cent  per  annum)  of  public  sector
Country  Period  Public  Private  Total in  inceeose  of
total  wage
employment
Brazil  1973-83  1.4  0.0  0.3  92
Costa  Rica  1973-83  7.6  2.8  3.5  34
Egypt  1966-76  2.5  -0.5  2.2  103
Ghana  1960-78  3.4  -5.9  -0.6  -
India  1960-80  4.2  2.1  3.2  71
Kenya  1963-81  6.4  2.0  3.7  67
Panama  1963-82  7.5  1.8  2.7  '5
Peru  1970-84  6.1  -0.6  1.1  140
Sri Lanka  1971-83  8.0  0.9  3.9  87
Tanzania  1962-76  6.1  -3.8  1.6  10
Thailand  1963-83  6.3  5.5  5.7  33
Trinidad  1970-84  4.7  1.2  1.9  51
Venezuela  1967-82  5.1  3.4  3.7  27
Zambia  1966-80  7.2  -6.2  0.9  418
Unweighted  mean  5.5  0.3  2.4
Sources:
Brazil:  Brazilian  Economic  Studies,  No.  5,  Rais  83; (urban  wage  employment).
Costa  Rica:  Echevarria  (1985),  from  government  sources.
Egypt:  Hansen  and  Radwan  (1982),  Table  15;  (establishments  of 10  or  more  employees  only.
Ghana:  Economic  Survey,  1961,  1977-80.
India:  Statistical  Abstract  of India,  1982;  (private  establishments  of 10  or  more  employees  only.
Kenya:  Statistical  Abstract,  1965,  1982.
Panama:  Echevarria  (1985),  from  official  statistical  sources.
Peru:  Comoendio  Estadistico  del  Sector  Publico  no-financiero.  1968-4. nuaria  Estadistico  del
Sector  Trabalo.  1981  (wage  employment  was extrapolated  backwards  by  two  years.
Sri Lanka:  Central  Bank  of  Ceylon  Annual  Report,  1979,  1984.
Thailand:  Renort  of the  Labor  Force  Survey,  1963,  1983;  (metropolitan  areas  only).
Tanzania: Statistical  Abstract,  1962,  Survey  of  Em,ioyment  and  Earnings,  1975-76.
Trinidad  and  Tobago: Annual  Statistical  Diaest,  1971/2,  Quarterly  Economic  Report,  July-Dec.
1984.
Venezuela:  Oficina  Central  de Estadistica  e Informatica,  various  years  (in  Echevarria,  1985).
Zambia:  Statistical  Yearbook,  1970,  Monthly  Digest  of  Statistics,  June-July  1985.Table  2  --  Parameter  Values,  Initial  Values  and  Experimental
Parameter Values
Parameter Values  (invariant)
Factor  shares  a,  = 0.5,  a2  = 0.5
Depreciation  rate  d  0.08
Price  of  sector  2 output  (numeraire)  P2  = 1
Technical  progress  rate  T1 = 0.01,  T2, =
0.02
Labor  force  growth  rate  A= 0.02
Initial  Values  (base  period) 1
Labour  supply  L  = 75
Capital  stock  K1=333,  K2=167,  K3=0
Employment  L 1 = 50,  L 2 =  25
Output  y 1 =  100,  Y 2 = 50
Wage  w1 = 1.0,  w2 =  1.0
Price  of  sector  1  output  P,  =  1
Rental  on capital  r1 = 0.15,  r2 0.15
Experimental  Parameter Values
Wage  gap  6  = 0,  1.5
Migration  damp  factor  m  = 0,  3,  10,000
Government  response  parameter  g  = 0,  0.5,  0.9
Government  capital  damp  factor  q  0,  0.5,  1.0
Saving  rates  so  =  0,  0.25
l=  0.5,  0
Tax  rates  t1 0,  t1 >  0
t2 > 0,  t2 = 0
tl  =  t2 >  0
1These  initial  values  relate  to  the  first  period,  when  6  =  0,  whereas
the  calibration  of  the  model  required  that  changes  be  introduced  only
in  the  third  period.  This  third  period  is  referred  to  in  the  text
and  subsequent  tables  as  the  base  period,  period  0.Table  3  --  Simulation  Results:  Employment,  Unemployment,  Labor  Force,  Capital  and  Rental  Rates,  Base  and  Final  Periods
Weak  Pressures  Strong  Pressures
Misallocation  Harris-Todaro  Government  Full  Government Government  Full  Government
Response  Response  Response  Response
--------------------------------- P  e  r  i o  d--------------------------------------------------------
0  13  0  13  0  13  0  13  0  13  0  13
Emoloyment  and  labor  force
Rural  sector  employment  (LI)  65.0  84.1  62.4  80.8  60.7  78.5  60.7  78.5  60.7  76.3  60.7  76.3
Urban  sector  employment  UPz)  13.0  16.8  12.5  16.2  12.1  15.7  12.1  15.7  12.1  15.3  12.1  15.3
Sink  employment  (L3)  0  0  0  0  1.7  2.2  1.7  2.2  1.7  4.4  1.7  4.4
Unemployment (U)  0  0  3.1  4.0  3.5  4.5  3.5  4.5  3.5  4.9  3.5  4.9
Labor  force  (  = L1 +  12 +  13 *  U)  78.0  100.9  78.0  100.9  78.0  100.9  78.0  100.9  78.0  100.9  78.0  100.9
Urban  labor  force  (=  U  1.2) +  13)  13.0  16.8  15.6  20.2  17.3  22.4  17.3  22.4  17.3  24.7  17.3  24.7
Rent-seekers  (= U +  L1)  65.0  84.1  65.5  84.8  64.2  83.0  64.2  83.0  64.2  81.2  64.2  81.2
Unemoloyment as  percentage  of:
Labor  force  0  0  4.0  4.0  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.9  4.5  4.9
Urban  labor  force  0  0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0
Emoloyment  in  sink  as  Percentage  of:
Labor  force  0  0  0  0  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  4.4  2.2  4.4
Urban  labor  forse  0  0  0  0  10.0  10.0  10.0  10.0  10.0  18.0  10.0  18.0
Unemployment  0  0  0  0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  90.0  50.0  90.0
Rent-seekers  0  0  0  0  2.7  2.7  2.7  2.7  2.7  5.5  2.7  5.5
Capital  stock:
Rural  sector  (K 1)  333  333  333  333  333  333  333  333  333  333  333  333
Urban  sector  (K 2)  225  558  225  548  225  500  225  468  225  459  225  367
Sink  (K 3)  0  0  0  0  0  0  16  33  0  0  16  107
Total  558  891  558  881  558  833  574  835  558  792  558  807
Caopital  stock  in  sink  as  Percentage  of:
Total  capital  stock  0  0  0  0  0  0  2.8  4.0  0  0  2.9  13.2
Increment  to  total  capital  stock  0  0  0  0  0  0  - 12.8  0  0  - 42.9
Rental  rates  on  capltal  as oercentage:
Rural  sector  12.6  22.5  12.3  21.9  11.9  20.1  10.6  19.2  11.9  18.5  10.6  15.8
Urban  modern  sector  9.3  6.7  9.1  6.7  8.8  6.7  7.8  6.8  8.8  6.7  7.8  7.2
Notes:
1The  CGAS  algorithm  was  run  for  16  periods  but  model  calibration  required  that  the  various  effects  be Introduced  in  the  third  period,  referred
in  the  table  as  period  0.
2"Weak  pressures"  are  defined  as  g  - 0.5  in  the  case of 'Government  response'  and  9  - 0.5,  q  - 0.5  in  the  case  of  "Full  government  response".  "Strong
pressures"  are  defined  as  g  - 0.9 in  the  case  of  "Government  response"  and  q = 0.9.  q  - 1.0  in  the  case  of "Full  government  response".
3The  productive  investment  equation  corresponds  to  equation  (26)  with  so  =  0.25. The  taxation  equation  corresponds  to (13)  with  t 1 > 0,  t2 >  0. i.e.
taxes  are  levied  on  both  rural  and  urban  production  at  the  same  percentage  rate  (t 1 u  t 2).Table  4  --  Simulation  Results:  Growth  of  Output  and  Output  Per  Worker
Weak  Pressures  Strong  Pressures
Harris-  Government  Futl  Government  Government  Full  Government
Misallocation  Todaro  Response  Response  Response  Response
output
Period  0  125.7  123.2  121.'4  121.4  121.4  121.4
Period  13  225.0  218.5  205.8  199.2  194.4  173.9
Period  13  (period  0 a  100)  179.0  177.4  169.5  164.1  160.1  143.2
Static  percentage  change  (in  period  0)  0  -2.0  -3.'.  -3.4  -3.4  -3.4
Average  percentage  Increase  per  period:
Dynamic  effect  only  4.6  4.5  4.1  3.9  3.7  2.8
Static  plus  dynamic  effects  4.6  4.3  3.9  3.6  3.4  2.5
2utout  -er  worker
Static  percentage  change (in  period  0)  0  -2.0  -3.4  -3.'  -3.4  -3.4
Average percentage  Increase  per  period:
Dynamic effect  only  2.5  2.5  2.1  1.8  1.7  0.8
Static  plus  dynamic effects  2.5  2.3  1.8  1.6  1.4  0.5
Not"st
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